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Abstract 
This paper addresses some of the problems associated with the integration of environmental 
and social values into the activities of contemporary responsible investment institutions. The 
first of these relates to the current participation gap between internal and external interests in 
responsible investment decision-making. The second problem concerns the lack of certainty 
regarding the normative basis under which multi-stakeholders should participate in 
institutional governance. Thirdly, there is at present no analytical framework with which to 
evaluate the institutional quality of responsible investment within the context of the global 
economy. In response, and building upon existing research in the realms of international 
relations and environmental politics, the paper uses a framework of principles, criteria and 
indicators to evaluate responsible investment institutions. The assumptions of this framework 
are tested against a small-scale attitudes survey regarding the governance quality of 
contemporary responsible investment institutions. Recognising the shortcomings of such a 
small study, the paper nevertheless finds a variety of perspectives, which indicate that the 
integration of multi-stakeholders in responsible investment institutions still has some way to 
go. The paper concludes with some observations on the nature of stakeholder involvement in 
responsible investment; comments on the extent to which the environmental social aspects of 
governance can be said to be institutionally embedded; and offers some reflections on the 
contribution of such an approach to governance analysis as a method for evaluating the 
contribution of responsible investment institutions to advancing sustainable development. 
Keywords: international relations, environmental politics, sustainable development, 
governance. 
  2 
Introduction 
In traditional investment practice, it has been generally assumed that the validity of claims 
made about a given product rest on the quality of information provided by financial advisors 
to assist in the making of investment decisions. While such an approach can be characterised 
as demonstrating financial responsibility, its contribution to determining social and 
environmental performance is limited. There has been a growth in investment practices that 
place greater emphasis on social and environmental, as well as economic, values, resulting in 
the designation of such investment as either ‘ethical’, or ‘socially responsible’, or simply 
‘responsible’. This paper uses the term responsible investment, or RI.  
The move away from purely financial considerations towards concerns about 
environmental and social responsibility – including corporate behaviour – has led to the 
growth of what is referred to as environmental-social governance, or ESG (Hawley and 
Williams, 2005). In 2005 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, one of the world’s largest law 
firms, investigated whether ESG considerations could legally be incorporated in investment 
decision-making and ownership practices (UNEP FI, 2005). Looking at the legal institutional 
frameworks in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the UK and the US, 
the report concluded that “integrating ESG considerations into an investment analysis ... is 
clearly permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdictions” (UNEP FI 2005, p. 13). The 
consequence of these developments is that institutional investors and shareholders are 
becoming increasingly involved in the deliberations underpinning investment activities. In the 
words of one report: 
Today, responsible investment is premised on the belief that ESG factors can enhance 
financial performance and should therefore be integrated into investment analysis and 
decision-making, including ownership practices. Consequently, shareholder 
activism/engagement is an approach increasingly being adopted (UNEP FI and Mercer 
2007, p. 7). 
However, while internal interests such as pension funds are being included in investment 
decision-making more meaningfully, there has been less progress on the ‘external’ side of the 
ledger. Third parties, such as local communities, or social/environmental organizations, still 
remain peripheral. The role afforded to these groups is generally one of passive consultation 
regarding, rather than active participation in, decisions to be made. They are important only in 
so far as they provide knowledge that is material to the investment decisions to be made. This 
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sets up a participation gap between internal and external interests, understood here as “an 
absence of direct access to stakeholders in decision-making” (Andonova and Levy, 2003/4).  
Given these developments, there is a strong case to be made for describing and evaluating, 
the integration of social and environmental values into RI institutions. There are two major 
difficulties associated with such an undertaking. The first of these concerns the fact that there 
are no clear normative principles or values against which various models of corporate practice 
can be measured (West, 2009). Secondly, there is as yet no universal governance theory, 
which can account for corporate practice in the context of a globalised economy (Carver, 
2010). This paper responds to these difficulties in two ways. It provides an historical narrative 
that delineates the normative features of stakeholder participation, as it is understood in the 
international political economy, and within environmental politics specifically. This narrative 
locates responsible investment within the policy arena of sustainable development as a 
mechanism for social and environmental, as well as economic, problem-solving. By viewing 
responsible investment as one of the mechanisms for advancing sustainable development, it is 
possible to use the recent analytical developments in global governance theory to more 
critically evaluate the relations between the multiple stakeholding interests involved in 
responsible investment, and their relationship to the governance quality of RI institutions.  
 
A normative theory of global governance for RI  
How then might political science map these developments in responsible investment onto 
contemporary governance theory? It is first necessary to locate RI and ESG within the 
normative context of contemporary global environmental politics. The United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, both of which 
arose out of the 1968 United Nations Commission on the Human Environment (UNCHE), 
placed the imperative for environmental action on the global level, and set the future for 
discussions about the environment within a normative context (Birnie 2000). Global action on 
the environment reached a high point with the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, at which sustainable 
development emerged the institutional mechanism for implementation (Bernstein 2002). 
Since UNCED, sustainable development has been implemented through a range of UN 
processes. These include the Commission for Sustainable Development (1992) and 
conventions on biodiversity (1992), climate change (1994), and desertification (1996). Since 
Rio, the UN has continued to promote sustainable development through a range of initiatives, 
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including the Global Compact (2000). Other programmes of significance include the 
Millennium Summit (2001) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002). In 
2005 the Global Compact collaborated with the United Nations Environment Programme 
Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) to create the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI, also 
known as UNPRI), which led to the development and introduction of the concept of 
environmental-social governance to the finance sector (UNPRI undated). There is therefore an 
extremely strong case to be mounted for the argument that both RI and ESG belong in this 
arena, and that the norms, which govern the institutions that function in this space, should be 
equally applied to RI institutions.  
What form does the governance of these post-Rio institutions take? Contemporary theory 
rejects traditional command-control institutional models and asserts that behaviour in 
organisations is to be understood in social-political, rather than strictly political, terms. A 
distinction is also made between ‘governing’ (understood as a process of coordination, 
steering, influencing or ‘balancing’ social-political interactions) and ‘governance’, interpreted 
as the structure that emerges in a social-political system as result of interaction. The 
interactions between structure and process together describe the nature of collaboration in 
‘new’ governance, which is understood in relational, rather than utilitarian, terms. It is these 
interactions that result in substantive outcomes, such as the formulation of criteria, or setting 
of standards. Structure, process and substantive outcomes are seen as interrelated components 
necessary for the solving of problems within contemporary governance (Kooiman 1993). 
Together, they have been identified as the key determinants of ‘governability’, defined as “the 
total quality of a social-political system to govern itself within the context of broader systems 
of which it is a part” (ibid. p. 259). This idea later re-emerges subsequently in terms of 
‘governance as structure’, understood as the models utilised by various institutions, and 
‘governance as process’, again referring to the idea of steering or coordinating (Pierre and 
Peters, 2000).  
Governance is also becoming increasingly understood in terms of its expression not only 
on the national and international levels, but at all spatial scales (Kjaer 2004; Perrons 2004). 
Contemporary environmental governance articulates this trend particularly strongly, and is 
exemplified by the interactions that occur between decentralised networks made up of 
multiple actors functioning at all levels (Haas 2002). Environmental politics therefore 
provides one of the best spaces available to study the emergence of new modes of governance 
that have arisen in response to globalization (Arts 2006). This is because it is in this arena that 
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some of the most extensive and innovative experiments in ‘new’ governance exist (Glück et al 
2005). It consequently provides one of the most useful lenses through which to scrutinise “the 
increasing tendency for collaboration in many sectors where political and economic trade-offs 
also exist” (Overdevest 2004). It is also clear from the literature that the structures of 
contemporary governance are understood as being participatory in nature in that they include 
more actors than traditional management models. Secondly, the processes through which 
decisions are made – recognising the broader participation of a range of actors – are more 
discursive in nature, requiring more deliberation than top-down systems (Fiorino 1999). This 
permits a theoretical description of contemporary governance in terms of ‘participation as 
structure’ and ‘deliberation as process’ (Cadman 2011). 
Looking at the specific normative preoccupations amongst scholars concerning 
institutional arrangements, it is possible to identify four main issue areas, which impinge on 
discussions regarding the quality of contemporary governance. The foremost without doubt 
concerns responsible organisational behaviour, usually understood in terms of accountability 
and transparency. Accountability has become a central aspect of the quality of governance 
debate, since the rise of new actors has necessitated a reconfiguration of existing mechanisms. 
Accountability is understood as being not merely internal (i.e. to such interests as 
shareholders), but also, external, to such interests as the general public, and is linked to what 
appears as a subsidiary attribute, transparency, expressed in terms of public access to 
information and decision-making procedures (Kerwer 2006).  
With the rise of globalisation and the integration of global financial markets, there have 
been calls for properly adapted principles of accountability at the global level, but the lack of 
universally accepted values and institutions is identified as a deterrent to such a project. 
Nevertheless, there is agreement that there is a need for a better meshing together of internal 
and external accountability measures at the global level (Keohane 2003). Others see the 
answer as more straightforward, calling for increased openness of global institutions. The 
application of freedom of information laws and generally freer access to information would 
account for the remoteness of accountability processes at the global level (Stiglitz 2003). 
Alternatively, the standards-based approach of some institutions of global governance is 
presented as a solution to demonstrating accountability (Kölliker 2006). 
A second and almost equally significant area of concern is around the representation of 
different stakeholder interests within a given institution. Here the discussion is largely about 
issues of inclusiveness and equality. Inclusiveness has been broken down into two elements, 
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access and weight. Access concerns who is bounded or affected by a given issue, and whether 
they have actively participated in framing any related policies or responses, whilst weight 
denotes the extent to which influence is shared equally amongst participants. Inclusiveness 
therefore sits along a power continuum and is measured by the extent to which participants 
are involved in decision-making processes and whether their input is taken into account 
(Koenig-Archibugi 2006). Democratic theorists commenting on global governance also link 
equality to inclusiveness – and by extension, exclusiveness to inequality – arguing that 
institutional legitimacy is normatively expressed by giving participants equal status in 
institutional processes (Young 2000). Effective interest representation in global governance 
also requires significant resources generally only available to well-endowed organisations, 
with access to ample finances (Scholte 2004). In order to avoid well-resourced interests from 
capturing or co-opting other rule-making participants within a system, mechanisms to provide 
for under-resourced interests, are also essential (Boström 2006). 
A third concern is centred upon decision-making, notably the presence or absence of 
institutional democracy, methods by which agreements are reached, and how disputes are 
settled. In the specific instance of corporate governance, for example, there have been 
growing demands for increased shareholder enfranchisement; here, such issues as having a 
‘say on pay’ are especially relevant (Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009). However, there is a 
somewhat pessimistic view on the ability of current modes of global governance to provide 
for genuine democracy. Market-based mechanisms confine democratic decision-making to 
policies conducive to economic development and are highly technocratic, with a very reduced 
role for the public. Corporate governance arrangements, despite some modest concessions to 
demonstrate a degree accountability and transparency, do not include major stake-holding 
interests directly affected by company policies, such as employees and local communities 
from decision-making (Hirst 2000). These shortcomings have led one commentator to call for 
the institution “of procedural rules arriving at collective decisions in a way which 
accommodates and facilitates the fullest possible participation of interested parties” (Bobbio 
1999, p. 19). There is a fairly strong indication that addressing the need to deal with social-
political dynamics of the ‘new’ new modes of contemporary governance therefore requires 
“processes of discursive consensus formation” (Meadowcroft and Lafferty 1996, p. 257; Held 
et al 1999). When conflict occurs within negotiations, or as a result of complaints over 
procedure, several sources identify the need for dispute-resolution mechanisms (Ostrom 1990; 
Van Vliet 1993; Meidinger 2006). The breakdown of processes of engagement and 
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negotiation and the inability to resolve conflicts have been identified as two key indicators of 
governance failure (Stoker 2000). 
The fourth major preoccupation is the manner in which policies, programmes or standards 
are implemented. In the domain of sustainability, effective implementation has been identified 
as relating to both the behavioural- and problem solving abilities of an institution (Skjærseth 
et al, 2006). In the context of responsible investment, behavioural change would refer 
specifically to changing behaviour around financial market activities that result in 
environmentally and socially unsustainable outcomes. The problem responsible investment is 
seeking to address is the negative externalities associated with unsustainable investment (e.g. 
deforestation). Given the inherently dynamic nature of the ecological systems (and related 
markets), such institutions also need to be resilient in the face of changing external 
circumstances, such as climate change, or market conditions. Non-resilient systems are 
unlikely to remain durable in the light of such changes (Folke et al, 2005). Durability in the 
context of responsible investment would refer to long-term investment practices that are based 
on environmentally and socially sustainable practices. Implicit in this understanding is the 
recognition that an activity, which is not economically viable, will not be durable.  
These various governance arrangements can be brought together into a hierarchically 
consistent framework of principles, criteria and indicators (PC&I), which allows for the 
evaluation of institutions of sustainable development. The PC&I approach to sustainability 
assessment became popular in the wake of UNCED (Rametsteiner et al, forthcoming). The 
value in such an approach is that it allows for performance evaluation in a hierarchically 
consistent and logical fashion (Lammerts van Beuren and Blom, 1997). The relationship 
between principles, criteria and indicators, and how the various elements discussed above, are 
laid out in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Hierarchical framework for evaluating the governance quality of RI 
Principle Criterion Indicator 
Accountability Organisational responsibility 
Transparency 
Inclusiveness 
Equality 
“Meaningful 
participation” 
Interest representation 
Resources 
Democracy 
Agreement 
“Productive 
deliberation” 
Decision-making 
Dispute settlement 
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Behavioural change 
Problem solving 
 Implementation 
Durability 
Source: Cadman 2011 
Here the principle, or value, adopted regarding participation as the fundamental structural 
aspect of governance is that it should be meaningful. This term is frequently associated with 
participation in much of the literature, and serves here as a normative, qualitative descriptor 
(Gaventa 2002). The second principle, referring to the deliberative, procedural, aspects of 
governance, has been ascribed the term productive as its descriptor (Dryzek and Braithwaite 
2000). In this context the principle is more than a statement about the democratic legitimacy 
of a process, as it refers both to the quality of deliberations, as they occur within the system, 
as well as the quality of the outcomes, or products, of those deliberations. It should also be 
noted that the framework does not directly include the concept of legitimacy, often used by 
many analysts to assess governance quality. This is because legitimacy is conceptualised as 
the output of institutional performance, which is determined by the successful interaction 
between the structural and procedural components of the governance system (Cadman 2011). 
 
Stakeholder reflections on the governance of RI institutions 
What do the stakeholders involved in responsible investment think about its institutional 
governance? In view of the normative developments discussed above, this paper conceives 
‘stakeholders’ in the broadest possible sense, as a group of diverse interests that collectively 
shape the institutions in which they interact. This allows for a more ethical, and less 
functionalist understanding of who participates in contemporary governance (Ruggie 1998). 
With the increasing role of civil society in responsible investment the definition has become 
more comprehensive, and includes civil society, the general public and local communities, as 
well as private organisations, governments and regulatory authorities, investors and unions – 
to name a few (GCGF and IFC undated). 
Using the analytical framework outlined above, a survey was developed to provide some 
insight into what stakeholders thought about the governance of RI institutions, defined as ‘any 
financial organisation (public, private, for profit, not for profit, etc.), which owns or manages 
an RI programme.’ In late 2009-early 2010 the author contacted various individuals who were 
invited to both evaluate and comment on the governance of the responsible investment sector 
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in an anonymous attitudes survey based on the eleven indicators of Table 1.1 These were 
identified from a range of institutional contexts, including academia, organisations offering 
investment-related awards and prizes, listed companies, investment conferences and events, 
financial institutions, governmental organisations (national, regional and international), 
indices, media, NGOs, professional associations, public-private partnerships, rating agencies, 
and researchers. On the basis of who responded and how they identified themselves, and in 
order to make analysis tractable, survey participants were broken down into six groups: fund 
managers, financial planner/advisers and advisers, responsible investment programmes, 
NGOs and researchers. Individual respondents were grouped under ‘other’ (comprising 
‘bank’, ‘ethical shareholder’, ‘higher education’, ‘private investor’, ‘third party’, ‘responsible 
investment association’). Table 2 below lists the type, response count and number of survey 
participants.  
Table 2: RI survey list of participants 
Type Number  Percent 
Fund manager 7 25% 
Financial planner and/or adviser 5 18% 
RI programme  4 14% 
percent 
NGO 3 11% 
Researcher 3 11% 
Other (Bank, Ethical shareholder, Higher education, Private 
investor, Third party, Responsible investment association) 
6 21% 
Total 28 100 
 
 
Method and results 
The PC&I framework outlined above was used to develop quantitative results. Respondents 
were also asked to score their perceptions, by means of the Internet tool Surveymonkey, 
www.surveymonkey.com, using a Likert scale from ‘very high’ to ‘very low’ (5-1 points). 
The response scale was weighted to produce an average rating for each of the stakeholder 
groups. These averages were combined into a total rating, which effectively represents the 
‘consensus rating’ of the survey participants as a whole. The results, rounded to the nearest 
whole number, are contained in Table 3 below. 
                                                
1 The author wishes to acknowledge Dr Enrico Bernardini, portfolio analyst at the Risk Management 
Department of Banca d'Italia, for his invaluable assistance in compiling the database of target organisations. 
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Table 3: Responsible investment governance survey – participants’ evaluation by associated 
indicators 
Principle 1. Meaningful Participation 
Criterion 1. Interest representation 
Highest possible score: 15 
Average score: 9 
2. Organisational 
responsibility 
Highest possible score: 10 
Average score: 6 
Sub-
total 
(out 
of 
25): 
15 
Indicator  Inclusive
-ness 
Equality Resources Account-
ability 
Transparency  
Fund 
manager 
3 3 4 3 3  
Financial 
planner/ 
adviser 
3 3 4 3 3  
RI 
programme 
4 4 4 4 4  
NGO 3 3 3 3 4  
Researcher 3 2 2 2 2  
Other 3 3 2 3 3  
Average 3 3 3 3 3  
Principle 2. Productive deliberation 
Criterion 3. Decision-making 
Highest possible score: 15 
Average score: 11 
4. Implementation 
Highest possible score: 15 
Average score: 11 
Sub-
total 
(out 
of 
30): 
22 
Indicator  Democracy Agree-
ment 
Dispute 
settlement 
Behaviour 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Dura-
bility 
 
Fund 
manager 
3 4 4 3 3 4  
Financial 
planner/advi
ser 
4 4 4 4 3 4  
RI 
programme  
3 4 4 4 3 4  
NGO 3 3 3 3 3 4  
Researcher 3 4 3 3 3 3  
Other 3 3 4 4 4 3  
Average 3 4 4 4 3 4  
Average 
Rating 
(out of 55) 
      
37 
 
Overall, respondents’ attitudes towards the governance quality of RI institutions were 
generally favourable. This would imply that there was a degree of confidence amongst survey 
participants in the structures and processes of governance across the sector. With an overall 
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rating of 37 or 67 percent, it could be said that RI institutions were seen by respondents to be 
performing credibly.  
For participation at the principle level, a score of 15, or 60 percent, is satisfactory. At the 
criterion level, interest representation performed relatively well, with a score of 9 or 60 
percent. Each of the associated indicators received an average score of ‘medium’, although it 
should be noted researchers gave ‘low’ scores for equality and resources, while ‘other’ gave 
resources a ‘low’ score. At the specific indicator level, inclusiveness achieved an almost 
universal score of ‘medium’, perhaps reflecting a general view that programmes tried to be 
inclusive, at least in terms of internal stake-holding interests. But one respondent was less 
sure as to whether this aligned with what the “people on the street” wanted. Other negative 
comments included: concerns about the narrowness of focus regarding what was included in 
investment portfolios; an overemphasis on what one respondent saw as “outdated” methods of 
assessment such as negative screening; and restricted definitions of sustainability, which 
overly concentrated on corporate governance risks rather than broader environmental and 
social issues. In the case of equality, one survey participant bluntly commented, “Nobody 
treats all interests equally, and nobody should”. The availability, or provision of resources 
(technical, institutional, financial) to participate in RI had the most varied results. Researchers 
and ‘other’ selected ‘low’, whilst fund managers, financial planners and RI programme all 
selected ‘high’. One researcher expressed the view that RI programmes within larger financial 
institutions tended to be “resource starved”. Resourcing was also a problem for “genuine 
ethical and sustainable fund managers”.  
Also with 60 percent, or 6 points, the criterion of organisational responsibility achieved 
passable, result. Here it should be noted that researchers provided only ‘low’ scores, and only 
the responsible investment programmes gave ‘high’ scores. One fund manager made the 
comment about accountability that although investors wanted to be “part of the dialogue 
about the RI investment process” they often had to deal with fund managers who were usually 
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part of large, conservative and mainstream banks, that were not particularly responsive to 
these demands. This had knock-on transparency-related effects as fund managers tended to 
keep information to themselves. As a result, these kinds of RI programme neither 
comprehensively disclosed their investment methodologies about the actual investments 
made, nor the reasons behind each investment. This was, they felt, creating a sense of mistrust 
in the public domain. One researcher commented further that they did not think a whole lot of 
attention was paid to accountability in the RI sector, and efforts at improvement had not gone 
very far. They expressed the view that the RI sector did not appear to perceive low levels of 
accountability as “major issue for the field, or at least a major barrier to expansion and 
mainstreaming”. Another researcher felt that there needed to be more accountability and 
monitoring of RI activity of institutions, so that investors could make clearer distinctions 
between those fund managers that were genuinely committed to RI and those that just paid it 
lip service. In this regard the view was expressed that UNPRI needed more enforcement 
capacity. 
Deliberation received a score at the principle level of 22, or 73 percent, a creditable 
performance. As a criterion, decision-making also performed creditably, scoring 11, or 73 
percent. All respondents scored the indicators either ‘medium’ or ‘high’, with the average 
results being ‘medium’ for agreement, and ‘high’ for both agreement and dispute settlement. 
For democracy it should be noted that only the responsible investment programmes scored the 
indicator ‘high’. A comment made by a fund manager regarding the democracy of RI, is 
worth inserting at this point:  
It is difficult to achieve democracy in RI systems, as they need to ensure a consistent 
process is followed. I don't think that democracy is a significant issue for RI 
investors. They only want to ensure that their money is being managed in a manner 
consistent to how they were told it would be managed.  
One financial planner commented that: 
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No business enterprise can be operated in a totally democratic way and prosper as a 
business. But to the extent that RI institutions welcome and consider input from 
various constituent groups, I would rate them high.  
One researcher didn’t see democracy as being “relevant to most firm structures, which engage 
employees fairly well in this space, but are not cooperatives etc.” In terms of how agreements 
were made in the sector, another researcher made the comment that “people get to consensus 
pretty well in the RI space”.  
Also with a score of 11, or 73 percent, was the criterion for implementation. In this case, 
both behaviour change and durability scored ‘high’, while problem solving scored ‘medium’. 
In terms of durability one NGO respondent commented that RI was “experiencing strong and 
consistent growth”, although one researcher felt that the jury was still out over the future of 
the sector. Another fund manager commented that RI would “be a lasting trend in the 
mainstream wealth management industry - if only because it addresses business risks and 
opportunities such as climate change”.  
The most detailed responses in the survey were made concerning RI’s influence on behaviour 
change. One response sums up these sentiments: 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that serious shareholder engagement 
programmes of the likes of Hermes, F&C and Regnan and others do indeed improve 
corporate behaviour… Also, whose behaviour is it important to change – the 
investors, or the actual companies causing the damage? Changing investor behaviour 
in terms of ‘considering’ ESG factors is irrelevant if it does not send signals to the 
companies causing the damage on the ground. So called ‘ethical funds’ that only 
screen, but do not engage, have no impact on the world whatsoever, yet claim to be 
responsible investors. In any discussion of what is a responsible investor, the focus 
needs to be on the actual impacts on the ground of the actions of that investor, not on 
some notional assessment of whether the companies they hold happen to be more or 
less responsible companies. You can hold a portfolio of responsible companies in a 
large, liquid, relatively efficient market and make no difference to anything 
whatsoever. 
The problem of ‘greenwashing’ that these observations imply, was raised by other 
respondents in various forms. One respondent from the ‘other’ group felt that RI products had 
become increasingly important to corporate entities involved in “irresponsible and 
unsustainable” activities and were now just one component they chose to use in what had 
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become in a “complex web” of investment drivers. Another commentator from the ‘other’ 
group noted that part of the problem associated with RI’s capacity to drive genuine behaviour 
change arose largely from the: 
The principle, that fund trustees must first and foremost make a profit this year 
[which] makes them timid, concerned only for the short term. The system favours the 
status quo, rather than courageous leaps into ‘riskier’ new areas, which we know we 
must invest in if this world is to be passed on in habitable form. 
One financial planner provided a contrast to his kind of timid approach. A more ‘activist’ 
institution, in their opinion, had a much greater capacity to change behaviour: 
RI institutions that are actively engaged in dialog with the companies in which they 
invest, and that use their power as shareholder to vote proxies and file proxy 
resolutions when necessary, can be very effective in changing the behaviour of 
corporations… However, RI institutions can be much more effective when working 
in concert with NGOs, using the media to bring pressure to bear, and getting broad 
coalitions of investors involved in the effort [emphasis in original]. 
RI’s contribution to problem solving was the weakest of all three indicators associated with 
implementation. Participants from across the survey groups did however point to specific 
examples where RI had made an important contribution to sustainable investment practices. 
One respondent pointed to commercial property development as a good example. Many large 
property funds now had a focus on owning energy efficient buildings, which was pushing 
these assets up in value. The weight of this money was devaluing unsustainable property. 
Another respondent felt that many RI programmes were actively contributing to the 
development of solutions to the problems of irresponsible and unsustainable development. 
Some programmes were operating in the RI space because they had merely identified a new 
business opportunity, but they were nevertheless still acting as “change agents”, even if they 
did not (yet) understand the importance of their role. 
 
Comments  
Given the small number of respondents (28), and the preponderance of Australians and New 
Zealanders (16) the study should be seen as entirely anecdotal, and merely indicative of some 
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of the viewpoints within the sector, rather than being in any way broadly representative or 
authoritative. Nevertheless, it reveals some interesting issues. One of the most obvious is that 
some ‘insiders’ (funds managers and RI programmes) generally rate the governance quality of 
RI consistently higher than more peripheral interests. See Table 4 below.  
Table 4: Results of governance quality survey by sub-sector, rating and percentage (in 
descending order) 
 
Sub-sector Rating Percentage 
RI programme  42 76% 
Financial 
planner/adviser 
39 71% 
Fund manager 37 67% 
NGO 35 64% 
Other 35 64% 
Researcher 32 59% 
 
This is perhaps not so surprising, but it would seem to add some cogency to the 
insider/outsider debate, and also how the various interests surveyed here view the governance 
of RI institutions. In this context, responsible investment programmes, financial 
planners/advisers and fund managers, who are closer to RI institutions (or indeed located 
within them), have rated their interaction with RI institutions highly. The perspectives 
afforded by other stakeholders, may provide a valuable check on the “hype” referred to by 
one fund manager. It is possible that the role of researcher by definition is functionally (if not 
actually) ‘external’, and affords these individuals a greater level of detachment, and possibly 
more objectivity, than other interests. For those respondents who selected ‘NGO’, it is to be 
noted that the scores are higher than both ‘other’ and ‘researcher’. This may be due to the fact 
that at least two of these respondents appeared to be responsible investment-related NGOs, 
rather than environmental groups, for example. Given the mix of respondents in ‘other’, it is 
difficult to comment on the meaning of this particular score. On a purely anecdotal level, it is 
interesting to see, when the results are broken down further, that the one ‘bank’ respondent 
tended to select ‘very high’ or ‘high’, the ‘third party’ usually opted for ‘high’ or ‘medium’, 
and the ‘private investor’ generally chose ‘medium’ or ‘low’. It would be nice to conclude 
that this lends credence to the centre/periphery thesis, but any such conclusion, in the absence 
of more comprehensive research can only remain hypothetical at this stage. 
 
Conclusions 
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An argument has been made here for the greater integration of stakeholding interests 
previously seen as peripheral into the structures and processes of responsible investment. 
Determining who is a ‘stakeholder’ in responsible investment can be either restrictive, or 
comprehensive. Traditional corporate governance would consider the term as being 
synonymous with ‘shareholder’. The case for an expanded view has been made by looking at 
developments within RI itself, and through exploring developments in the understanding of 
participation and deliberation as aspects of ‘good’ governance at the global level. The 
implications of this perspective would be to extend the understanding of stakeholder beyond 
the ‘internal’ beneficiaries of RI, to include ‘external’ interests, such as civil society 
organisations. To this list, on the basis of the research in this paper, might be added individual 
private investors, researchers, ethical shareholders, and the like. On this view, stakeholder 
engagement has a wider meaning than currently, as it refers to the action of integrating multi-
stakeholders into the structures and processes of RI institutional governance. This would give 
any analysis of stakeholder considerations a broader significance to investment decisions than 
before – and perhaps give these decisions a greater level of legitimacy.  
Are environmental and social values embedded in the governance of RI institutions? On 
the basis of this paper, the answer would have to be ‘mixed’. Across the board, respondents 
were favourably inclined towards the efficacy of institutional mechanisms for decision-
making and implementation. The one possible exception here is with regards to democracy. 
There was some reluctance amongst respondents to engage with the notion that decision-
making should be democratic. Here, the preoccupation was more about financial performance. 
However, the point that should be made here is that most investors have put their money into 
a fund where the decision over what to invest in has already been made, and their concern is 
not a democratic one; they just want to make sure the fund in which they have invested 
broadly meets their own expectations about responsibility. This may reveal an underlying 
tension in RI institutional governance. While this may be true for fund managers, investors or 
other influential actors, this perspective might not sit well with stakeholders more peripheral 
to the institutional centres, but affected by its activities, such as Indigenous peoples, or local 
communities. This distance from the decision on what the fund should look like may or may 
not have democratic implications, depending on the extent to which the fund engaged, or did 
not engage, with environmental and social interests during the formation of the fund. Here, 
there is a resonance with the issue of equality. It may be a statement of fact that nobody treats 
all interests equally in RI institutions, but whether they should or not, or at least make greater 
efforts at more equality of representation, is open to debate. Finally, it is both surprising, and 
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slightly alarming, that accountability and transparency did not achieve a higher score. As a 
core attribute of RI, there is room for improvement. 
Since UNCED, PC&I have become a primary means by which the effectiveness of 
sustainable development is evaluated in the field, and the basis for accreditation in the market. 
The advantage of the framework presented here for analysing RI institutional performance 
over existing methods of assessment, which emphasise single criteria (e.g. accountability), or 
emphasise only E, S, or G (or combinations thereof) is that it establishes a strong hierarchical 
logic between all the elements commonly identified as pertaining to sustainable development. 
It also places quality of governance at the centre of institutional performance, rather than 
another ‘criterion’ for assessment. This more comprehensive scale of evaluation may help 
avoid the uncertainty that currently exists over the credibility of a given programme, and 
whether to lend it legitimacy by participating. This would be an important step forward for 
RI, which makes some big claims about the merits of its activities. Much in particular, for 
example, is made of the need for transparency and accountability in ventures in which RI 
institutions are seeking to invest. Finally, little attention has been paid to the governance of RI 
institutions themselves. Here the issue has to be raised as to whether RI institutions evaluate 
their own performance to the same levels they expect of those in whom they invest. Given the 
pressing social and environmental problems, which confront the planet in this current era, it 
will become increasingly important to determine whether RI institutions are indeed solving 
problems of global significance, and shifting investor behaviour towards sustainable and 
responsible investment at both institutional and systemic levels. 
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